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INTRODUCTION: THE PURPOSES OF RULEMAKING PROCEDURE
Recent scholarship by Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R.
Weingast,1 and by Arthur Lupia and McCubbins,2 sheds new light on an
important administrative law subject: the rationale for and the utility of the
procedures that an administrative agency must follow in order to adopt rules.
According to the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), an agency must give
public notice of a proposed rule and allow any interested person to provide
written comments on that rule.3 The agency must also supply a concise
statement of the basis and purpose of a rule when it is adopted.' A final rule
must be published in the Federal Register,5 and its effective date must be
delayed until thirty days after publication.
What purposes does the notice-and-comment procedure serve? While the
legislative history of the APA is unilluminating, courts and commentators have
identified two significant purposes. The first is utilitarian, and the second is
drawn from political theory.
The utilitarian purpose is that the notice-and-comment procedure produces
better rules than a regime lacking such procedure. When evaluated by the
conventional utilitarian calculus,7 this congressional insight seems correct. The
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1. These three authors combined parts of their last names to create the author acronym
"McNollgast" [hereinafter they will be cited and referred to as McNollgast]. McNollgast, Administrative
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987) [hereinafter McNollgast,
Administrative Procedures]; McNollgast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative
Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REv. 431 (1989) [hereinafter McNollgast,
Structure and Process].
2. Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Designing Bureaucratic Accountability, 57 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 91 (Winter 1994).
3. The Administrative Procedure Act was adopted in 1946. The current version of the notice and
comment provisions is 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) and (c) (1988). The Act will be cited herein as APA without
the prefatory cite to U.S.C.
4. APA § 553(c).
5. Id. § 552(a)(1)(D).
6. Id. § 553(d).
7. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, A Comment on Trial- Type Hearings in Nuclear Power Plant Siting,
58 VA. L. REv. 585, 591-93 (1972); Paul Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure,
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conventional approach balances three factors: accuracy, efficiency, and
acceptability. Accuracy refers to whether the procedure is likely to produce an
outcome that is best aligned with available data, is most rational, and most
closely approximates the result the legislature would have produced had it
considered the issue. Efficiency means reaching the outcome at the lowest cost
to government and to affected private interests and with the least delay.
Acceptability means that the procedure seems fair to the interests affected by the
outcome. Since these three factors often point in different directions, design of
the most appropriate procedure to effectuate a specific function often calls for
a somewhat intuitive balancing act. Several generations of commentators have
agreed that the APA's notice-and-comment procedure strikes a pretty good
balance.
With respect to accuracy, the APA's notice provision makes it likely that
interested parties will find out about a proposed rule and will submit comments
designed to influence the decisionmakers. Both outsiders and other agencies are
welcome to furnish input, either on the record or ex parte, resulting in a large
base of data and opinion.9 As a result, the rulemaking agency must focus its
attention on the political implications of the proposed rule as well as on the
rule's practical costs and benefits. All this seems well calculated to produce
"accurate" outcomes: ones that are informed by available data but that also
reflect the political preferences of commentators and the chief executive.1"
Yet the APA rulemaking procedures seem relatively efficient. They forgo
time-consuming steps such as cross-examination and, as originally conceived,
contained no special requirements for consultation, scientific studies, submission
of proposed rules to outside agencies, or findings of fact.
Finally, these procedures seem relatively acceptable to the people who must
live with the resulting rules-both beneficiaries of the rules and persons to be
regulated by them. Such persons have an opportunity to place their views on the
record and to examine and respond to the submissions of other parties. The
agency cannot make too large a change from proposed to final rule without
reproposing the rule."l As embellished by court decisions, the APA requires
the agency to respond to material comments, so that commentators are assured
78 COLUM. L. REV. 258, 279-93 (1978).
8. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 404-08 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
9. According to case law, an agency must make available critical data in its files, such as test results
or other technical data, in time for commentators to evaluate and criticize it. Portland Cement Ass'n
v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375,392-94 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974). This requirement
makes it more likely that the comment process will entail a genuine interchange that is likely to produce
a more accurate rule.
10. This conclusion holds regardless of whether the observer adheres to the transmission belt,
expertise, pluralism, or civil republication models of administrative law. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic
Republication Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1513-16, 1559-62 (1992);
see generally Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1667 (1975).
11. If a final rule is not the "logical outgrowth" of the proposed rule, the agency must repropose
the rule. BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 642 (1st Cir. 1979).
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that their inputs are at least considered.1 2 Judicial review is generally available
and, at the review stage, courts scrutinize both the legality and the reasonable-
ness of a final rule. While regulatees would probably prefer trial-type
protections, the APA package of administrative and judicial process provides an
acceptable compromise.
In addition to this utilitarian rationale, the APA rulemaking procedure has
a second important purpose: it provides an ingenious substitute for the lack of
electoral accountability of. agency heads. Indeed, rulemaking procedures are
refreshingly democratic: people who care about legislative outcomes produced
by agencies have a structured opportunity to provide input into the decisionmak-
ing process. In this respect, the agency lawmaking process is vastly superior to
the unstructured and chaotic procedures of the legislature. Congressional
lawmaking is, all too often, characterized by behind the scenes dealmaking with
special interests who have made large campaign contributions.
II
MCNOLLGAST AND REGULATORY COSTS
Now how does all this relate to McNollgast's work? They posit an additional
purpose for rulemaking procedure, one wholly distinct from those already
mentioned: rulemaking procedure serves as a "fire alarm."' 3 The procedure
energizes constituents who will alert legislators to instances in which agencies
stray from the path of righteousness. In particular, the fire alarms will inform
the legislators, who formed the coalition that originally delegated rulemaking
authority, that the agency contemplates action that departs from the legislative
deal.
McNollgast's work ties in with a long tradition of political criticism of
overbroad delegations as an abdication of legislative responsibility. 4 Instead
of criticizing such delegations, however, McNollgast accepts them as inevitable
and focuses on the principal-agent problem inherent in broad delegations."
12. Rodway v. United States Dep't of Agric., 514 F.2d 809, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
13. McNollgast, Administrative Procedures, supra note 1; McNollgast, Structure and Process, supra
note 1.
14. See, e.g., THEODORE J. LOWi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS
OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY 29-33 (2d ed. 1969); Peter Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation,
68 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 63-77 (1983). I tend to regard the congressional abdication and agency
illegitimacy arguments as unpersuasive. The odds are that the problem will be solved better, with lower
implementation costs, by allowing an agency broad discretion to deal with it rather than by tying its
hands in advance by overly detailed and restrictive statutory delegations. See Jerry L. Mashaw,
Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985);
Karla W. Simon, Congress and Taxes: A Separation of Powers Analysis, 45 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1005,
1014-49 (1991).
15. I appreciate the fact that McNollgast's work is free from the assumption, prevalent in public
choice literature, that agency decisionmakers are simply profit maximizers whose actions can be modeled
on the assumption that they seek only to expand their empires or stuff their own wallets. Instead,
McNollgast assumes that agencies pursue their own vision of the public interest, but recognizes that this
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Given that the legislature has failed to spell out what it wants, McNollgast seeks
relatively cheap oversight devices that a legislature might adopt to keep the
agency faithful to the original deal struck by the enacting coalition.
McNollgast identifies administrative procedure as the answer. They claim
that the APA's rulemaking process stacks the deck in favor of the interests
intended to be favored by a regulatory scheme. These interests furnish data
inputs to agency decisionmakers. These inputs influence ultimate outcomes in
the direction the enacting coalition would have preferred if it had resolved the
issue when it passed the law. Moreover, favored constituencies can trip the
legislative fire alarm and thereby alert legislators that some administrative
monkey business is going on. Once the alarm sounds, congressional fire brigades
will arrive to douse the fire. Knowing that this is likely to occur, agencies are
constrained ex ante from attempting tricky moves away from the coalitional
preference. Lupia and McCubbin's insightful article advances the ball by
suggesting that these procedures remain useful even given the possibility that
both agencies and constituents may send false signals to a relatively uninformed
legislature.16
I do not doubt that Congress has sometimes fashioned administrative
procedures that have a deck-stacking function. In particular, the legislature
sometimes goes beyond the APA rudiments and crafts elaborate "hybrid" or
super-APA procedural requirements that do seem to favor particular constituen-
cies. And I agree that APA rulemaking procedure, along with hybrid procedure,
sometimes proves useful in implementing statutes and facilitating legislative
oversight.17
Nevertheless, I am skeptical of the claim that the McNollgast hypothesis
provides a descriptive account of what Congress intended when it enacted the
basic APA administrative procedure conventions or even most hybrid proce-
dures." The oversight-facilitation purpose of rulemaking procedure seems
much less important than the purposes already pointed out: producing accurate
rules in an acceptable manner at the least cost and helping to legitimate
decisionmaking by electorally unaccountable elites. Certainly, if any members
of Congress had oversight facilitation in mind when they adopted the rulemaking
procedures in the APA, they kept that purpose wholly to themselves. To my
vision might be at variance with that embodied in the original legislative bargain.
16. Lupia & McCubbins, supra note 2.
17. See Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59,
72-73 (1992) (environmental groups play crucial rule in implementing environmental statutes).
18. Congress generally states that the extra steps it sometimes prescribes will produce better, more
carefully considered rules. It says nothing about protecting favored interests or facilitating oversight.
See Craig N. Oren, Clearing the Air: The McCubbins-Noll-Weingast Hypothesis and the Clean Air Act,
9 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 45, 80-97 (1989) (refuting McNollgast account of purpose of hybrid procedures in
Clean Air Act). In other situations, hybrid procedures seem intended largely as bones thrown to losers
in the legislative process; the losers hope that the hybrid procedures will be so onerous that they will
prevent the agency attorney from doing very much.
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knowledge, no trace of that purpose emerges in the legislative history of the Act
or of the reports that led up to it.19
If one abandons the notion that the purposes of the APA (or of most super-
APA hybrid procedures) were facilitation of oversight and protection of the
original legislative deal, can one at least assert that the procedures have this
fortuitous good effect? Perhaps, but the APA procedures are designed in a
pretty clumsy manner to achieve that result.
It is difficult to understand how the standard notice-and-comment rulemaking
procedure of the APA does much to preserve the original balance struck by the
legislative coalition that enacted the bill-assuming the coalition even reached
agreement on the issue as opposed to papering it over through a vague
delegation to an agency to solve the problem.2' Rulemaking procedure gives
exactly the same participation opportunity to groups that opposed the original
legislation as to those that supported it.21 To the extent the standard APA
procedure influences outcomes, it tends to help the interest groups who are best
organized at the time the rule is proposed-who may well have been the losers
in the original legislative combat. And when groups that oppose agency action
trip legislative fire alarms, the fire will be doused (or fed or ignored) by the
existing power balance in the legislature rather than by the coalition that existed
at the time the legislation was enacted.'
Still, the McNollgast hypothesis does seem to explain at least some super-
APA hybrid procedures that serve a deck-stacking function. Thus it is helpful
in understanding and critiquing rulemaking procedures. But is their hypothesis
totally benign? My problem is this: if one takes McNollgast's insights seriously
and presses them to their logical limits, one might be troubled by the relatively
poor fit between the oversight-facilitation purpose and the design of the existing
procedures. A response to this concern might be to pile some new and better
designed procedures atop the existing ones. At that point, the McNollgast theory
would slip from description to normative prescription. And, inevitably, such new
procedures would be costly. I want to urge that this temptation be resisted.
What sorts of costly new procedures might a McNollgast disciple be in favor
of? Lupia and McCubbins, concerned that an agency might lie to the legislature,
19. See ATr'Y GEN. COMM., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES; S. Doc.
No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 102-15 (1941). The Attorney General's Committee did not recommend that
Congress enact mandatory rulemaking procedures, but it praised the procedures already used by
agencies. These procedures give opportunity to all persons affected to present their views and elicit
systematically the information necessary to fair and intelligent action.
20. More often than not, even super-APA hybrid procedures are poorly designed for protecting
coalitional deals or facilitating oversight. See Glen 0. Robinson, Commentary on "Administrative
Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies": Political Uses of Structure and Process, 75 VA. L.
REV. 483, 489-95 (1989).
21. See Jeffrey S. Hill & James E. Brazier, Constraining Administrative Decisions: A Critical
Examination of the Structure and Process Hypothesis, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 373, 393-94 (1991). Hill and
Brazier observe that judicial doctrines liberally permitting standing to seek judicial review, or allowing
hard look judicial review, are as likely to benefit interests opposed to the regulatory scheme as those that
were part of the enacting coalition.
22. Id. at 384; Robinson, supra note 20, at 495; Seidenfeld, supra note 10, at 1526-27.
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appear to favor a system of penalties to make lies more costly to the agency.23
They would probably also support installation of a verifier function whenever
possible. Indeed, Lupia and McCubbins seem to favor cost-raising techniques as
a positive good since the existence of high agency costs itself gives valuable
information to the legislature about the agency's preferences.24
This logic might lead McNollgast devotees to favor more frequent use of
deck-stacking techniques in statutes creating regulatory schemes. One common
form of deck-stacking is mandatory consultation by the agency with carefully
constituted advisory committees or scientific panels.' Another promising idea
is subjecting the agency to exogenous control over its agenda.26  Hardy deck-
stacking perennials include requirements to produce impact statements27 or
elaborate cost-benefit or regulatory analyses before taking action.2 Subsidies
or cost reimbursements to certain kinds of favored participants would reduce
their entry costs and thus help to assure their participation. McNollgast
enthusiasts might favor legislative vetoes,29 or at least mandatory submission of
a proposed rule to legislative committees or to the drafters of the original
bills.' They should be strongly in favor of Administrative Rule Review
Committees, such as exist in some states31 and in the United Kingdom.32
23. Lupia and McCubbins are not very clear about the sort of penalties they have in mind. One
penalty they seem to favor is judicial reversal of agency action. Undeniably a judicial order to an agency
to start from scratch is costly to the agency and thus a potent deterrent. Other sanctions that Lupia and
McCubbins might favor would include bad publicity in the media, a nasty oversight hearing before a
legislative committee, an appropriation rider, or, at the limit, total defunding of the agency or an agency
function. But, as McNollgast's earlier work indicates, such sanctions are costly to both the principal and
the agent and should be avoided. McNollgast, Administrative Procedures, supra note 1, at 273. See Jerry
L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment ofAgency Rulemaking: An Essay on Management, Games, and
Legal and Political Accountability, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185 (Spring 1994) (oversight hearings
can degenerate into circuses).
24. Lupia & McCubbins, supra note 2, at 106-07.
25. See generally Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process,
41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1407-10 (1992).
26. McNollgast, Administrative Procedures, supra note 1, at 267 (referring to the Consumer Product
Safety Commission and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration).
27. The environmental impact statement is the most prominent of such requirements. Among
numerous others that have been used or still exist are required analyses of the impact of a rule on small
business, families, foreign trade, and federalism. McGarity, supra note 25, at 1400-07.
28. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988)
(requiring preparation of regulatory impact statements). Executive Order 12,291 has been superseded
by Executive Order 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993), which also requires agencies to consider costs,
benefits, and alternatives of significant rules but dispenses with formal regulatory impact statements.
29. Legislative vetoes were invalidated in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). However, they might
be valid under state constitutions.
30. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11,017.5(b) (West 1992) (agency must file reports with author of
statute and notify author of all proposed regulations implementing statute as long as the author is a
member of the legislature).
31. See MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT §§ 3-203, 3-204, 15 U.L.A. 1 (1990);
ARTHUR E. BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING § 8.3 (1986 & Supp. 1992). Under the
Model Act, if the A.R.R.M. objects to a rule, the burden shifts to the agency on judicial review to
establish that the rule is within the procedural and substantive authority delegated to the agency.
MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 3-204(d)(5).
32. Michael Asimow, Delegated Legislation: United States and United Kingdom, 3 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 253, 266 (1983).
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McNollgastians would be relatively indifferent to delays, because they might
prefer a ponderous, slowed-down rulemaking calendar. A deliberate pace tends
to prevent a fait accompli and provides plenty of chances for the fire alarms to
study the implications of proposed agency action and to get in touch with their
chosen Congressperson.33 For example, multiple rulemaking cycles would give
the legislature a good opportunity to intervene in the process. To force
everything into the open, accessible to members of the public and Congress,
McNollgastians might lean in favor of limitations on outsider ex parte contacts
with agency decisionmakers, inhibitions on off-record participation by staff
members in the decisionmaking process, requirements of public oral hearings,
and even cross-examination of agency experts. They would probably favor rigid
enforcement of the existing APA provisions, for example by requiring
resubmission of a proposed rule if the agency planned any significant changes.'
They might want to require the agency to respond in detail to every comment
on pain of reversal. 35  They would be attracted to schemes that require an
agency to submit proposed rules to other agencies that would scrutinize them,
furnish input, and have the legal or at least practical ability to sidetrack or veto
the rule.36
Finally, McNollgastians might well take a strongly pro-judicial review stance.
Such a stance would include pre-enforcement judicial review of rules37 with
plenty of judicial hard looks at the factual underpinnings of rules as well as the
rationality of the agency's judgment.38 Perhaps there should be high standards
of justification that a rule must meet to survive review.39 Prompt and intense
judicial review might facilitate oversight by drawing congressional attention to
possible departures by the agency from the original coalitional deal; in addition,
if sufficient hints of that deal can be planted in the statute, the judges could
33. Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative Agencies, 8
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93, 97-98 (1992); McNollgast, Structure and Procedure, supra note 1, at 441.
34. For an example of extremely strict enforcement of the APA rulemaking notice provision, see
Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 750-52 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
35. McGarity, supra note 25, at 1400-01, discusses the burdensome nature of the requirement that
the agency answer all material comments; any slipup in responding to a comment could trigger judicial
reversal with devastating consequences for the rulemaking project.
36. The prototype is submission of proposed rules to OMB under Executive Order 12,291. See
supra note 28. The enormous regulatory costs and delays attributable to the OMB referral requirement
are well documented by E. Donald Elliott, TQM-ing OMB: Or Why Regulatory Review Under Executive
Order 12291 Works Poorly And What President Clinton Should Do About It, 57 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 167 (Spring 1994); McGarity supra note 25, at 1428-36, 1448-50.
37. See Mashaw, supra note 23, at 221-29 (questioning the assumption that rules should normally
be reviewable before they are actually applied to the plaintiff).
38. There is a vast literature on the hard look doctrine. For illumination of what we mean by "hard
look," see Ronald M. Levin, Scope-Of-Review Doctrine Restated: An Administrative Law Section Report,
38 ADMIN. L. REv. 239, 246-60 (1986).
39. The most common example of this phenomenon is substitution of the substantial evidence test
for the normal arbitrary and capricious test. Although it is unclear what Congress means by this
substitution, some courts take the substantial evidence test to require them to engage in an intrusive
form of judicial review of agency rules. See, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1220-
30 (5th Cir. 1991) (overturning EPA's asbestos regulations by second guessing the EPA's judgment that
the health effects of banning asbestos justified the costs of doing so).
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actually enforce the contract when the rule is reviewed.' Moreover, judicial
reversal is itself a potent penalty that an agency might suffer if it strays from its
proper role.
All these procedures, structures, and institutions might well be favored by
people who want to enhance the abilities of the rulemaking process to steer
agencies in a desired direction or to serve a fire alarm function. In general, I am
opposed to doing these things. Each device would drive up the regulatory costs
of rulemaking and foster what Mashaw calls "adversary legalism.""' Instead of
launching a new wave of proceduralization, I would opt for the original APA
skeleton model and for soft-look judicial review.
Regulatory costs can be extraordinarily high even under a bare-bones notice-
and-comment regime and have now become nearly prohibitive under the various
additional constraints, requirements, and hard looks already imposed by the
executive, judicial, and legislative branches.42 The result is what Thomas
McGarity and others have described as the "ossification" of the rulemaking
process-the near abandonment of rulemaking and the substitution of various
suboptimal regulatory techniques to achieve the same goals without incurring the
costs.43 This failure of rulemaking explains a great deal about why so many
federal laws designed to protect consumers, workers, or the environment have
been so ineffective."
I fear that the McNollgast thesis can lead us to accept a set of rulemaking
procedures and judicial review conventions that would be much more costly than
the existing ones. Of course, McNollgast is not necessarily insensitive to the
problem of regulatory cost; indeed Lupia and McCubbins rightly call attention
to the costs an agency bears in making a proposal and bringing it to fruition. 45
Nevertheless, there is little in the work of McNollgast or Lupia and McCubbins
that points to the inevitable conflict between keeping regulatory costs down and
building fire alarm systems.
40. See Motor Vehicle Mfg. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 55 (1983)
(stating that Congress wanted safety rather than cost to be paramount purpose of regulation). This is
not self-evident, however, since a McNollgastian might fear that a court would nudge the agency in the
direction that judges rather than the enacting Congress would prefer.
41. Mashaw, supra note 23, at 250.
42. At the Law and Contemporary Problems conference, E. Donald Elliott (formerly general
counsel of the Environmental Protection Agency) stated that it now costs the EPA about $2 million and
two years to adopt a rule-if it is pushing to get the rule out promptly and without considering the
additional delays imposed by judicial review and potential judicial remand. This is horrendous. See E.
Donald Elliott, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS 167 (Spring 1994).
43. See generally Mashaw, supra note 23, at 195; McGarity, supra note 25. McGarity also observes
that these same cost hurdles inhibit agencies from revising old, outdated, and inefficient rules or from
adopting flexible, experimental rules.
44. See generally Mashaw, supra note 23; McGarity, supra note 25, at 1391.
45. See generally Lupia & McCubbins, supra note 2. At the Law and Contemporary Problems
symposium, Roger Noll strongly affirmed his concern with high costs and denied that McNollgast was
ever indifferent to the problem of regulatory costs. And McNollgast originally pointed to the extremely
negative effect on agency programs and delivery of services of imposing sanctions such as time
consuming and highly publicized congressional investigations and midnight massacres. McNollgast,
Administrative Procedures, supra note 1, at 252.
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I would like to suggest a simple model of bureaucratic behavior to predict the
effect of increasing regulatory costs. Every agency has, in the short run, a fixed
budget. Indeed, given present conditions of austerity at state and federal levels,
the longer-term prospects probably favor declining budgets for most regulatory
agencies-certainly in real terms. The agency also has a set of regulatory
responsibilities. It cannot possibly discharge all of them. For example, it cannot
perform needed economic or technical studies of the regulatory problem; it
cannot adequately monitor the regulated industry to carry out its law enforce-
ment function; it cannot prosecute more than a few of the most egregious
violations of its rules; it cannot possibly launch and complete more than a few
of the possible rulemaking initiatives that might be available; it cannot issue all
of the regulatory guidance about existing rules that it should.
Given this condition of scarcity, an agency must make hard choices about the
deployment of its limited resources. There are always other readily available
substitutes for any particular use of resources. Faced with an increase in the cost
of producing a particular bureaucratic product, an agency might produce the
same quantity of that product but cut back somewhere else. For example, it
might continue to make rules but reduce investigation and prosecution of
violators. Or it might produce less of that particular output, leaving the
resources devoted to the activity constant. Or it might reduce the resources
devoted to that type of output and put the money somewhere else (for example,
it might substitute adjudication for rulemaking).
Available evidence suggests that agencies are quite responsive to increases
in the marginal cost of producing a given output.' Increases in the costs of
rulemaking, or increases in the intensity of judicial review of rules, tend to result
in the production of fewer rules. Agencies tend to substitute other forms of
regulatory outputs for rulemaking; for example, they use adjudication or informal
guidance documents in lieu of rules. This is undesirable because the public has
much less opportunity to participate in the making of law through adjudication
or informal guidance,47 because they tend to frustrate accountability mecha-
nisms including legislative oversight, and because these expedients are less
effective as tools to carry out the regulatory scheme.
A recent study of the behavior of California agencies lends support to my
hypothesis' and to the findings of others who have questioned elaborate
rulemaking procedure. This study focused on the production by California
46. These studies are discussed in McGarity, supra note 25, at 1385-96, 1412-13. See also JERRY
L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990); James T. Hamilton &
Christopher H. Schroeder, Strategic Regulators and the Choice of Rulemaking Procedures: The Selection
of Formal vs. Informal Rules in Regulating Hazardous Waste, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111 (Spring
1994) (strategic substitution of informal EPA guidance documents for legislative rules); Richard J. Pierce,
Jr., Unruly Judicial Review of Rulemaking, NAT. RESOURCES & ENVT. 23 (Summer 1990).
47. See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the
Like-Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.. 1311 (1992) (misusing of
policy statements, adopted without public participation, to bind the public).
48. Michael Asimow, California Underground Regulations, 44 ADMiN. L. REv. 43 (1992).
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agencies of guidance documents such as interpretations, rulings, guidelines, policy
statements, manuals, bulletins, and the like. Every agency should and must
produce a steady flow of guidance material.49 It is vital that the affected public
and the agency staff know how the agency interprets its rules and how it will
exercise its discretion. This enables private sector regulatees to plan activities
in a way that will minimize their costs and keep them out of trouble, and enables
the staff to enforce the law in a uniform and efficient manner.
Under the federal APA, guidance documents (known as interpretive rules
and policy statements) are exempt from rulemaking procedure; they can be
adopted without any procedures at all' and are unlikely to be judicially
reviewed in advance of their actual application to a regulatee 1 In California,
they can be adopted only with full-fledged rulemaking procedures.52 Moreover,
like all other rules, they must survive scrutiny by California's Office of
Administrative Law ("OAL"). OAL is empowered to disapprove rules on the
basis of lack of clarity, illegality, or a failure to demonstrate that the rule is not
reasonably necessary in light of the facts in the rulemaking record. 3 Thus
California's system provides for verifiers, deck stacking, and fire alarms in
abundance.
The combination of rulemaking procedure and the OAL approval
requirement almost completely dried up the flow of guidance documents adopted
in accordance with law.' In lieu of producing such documents, agencies
contrived other ways to guide regulated constituencies and agency staff. They
used negotiated outcomes and informal adjudication instead of rulemaking; they
sent individualized letters of advice but never generalized them; they advised
staff through oral briefings but did not write down the guidelines; they stated
that compliance with the guidelines was "voluntary"; they let it be known what
sort of guidance the agency planned to issue in the future, but never got around
to actually providing it; they went to the legislature for a change in the statute
rather than adopting a rule.
49. See MICHAEL AsIMow, ADVICE TO THE PUBLIC FROM FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
(1973); Peter L. Strauss, Comment, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1480-84 (1992).
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letter signed by agency head ripe for review in light of serious practical consequences to industry of
ignoring it).
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file and to respond to every comment) and go much further. For example, they require oral hearings
on request and a whole array of impact statements and analyses. Asimow, supra note 48, at 48-50.
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enforced unless adopted as a regulation and filed with the Secretary of State. CAL. GOV'T CODE §
11347.5 (West 1992). This provision is strongly enforced by courts. See Asimow, supra note 48, at 53-55.
54. Asimow, supra note 48, at 55-62.
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In some cases, agencies adopted guidance materials or manual supplements
(or enforced existing ones) without following rulemaking procedures and hoped
they would not get caught-a risky strategy in light of judicial sanctions for
noncompliance. Finally, many agencies just did nothing at all to supply guidance
and let everyone wonder what the correct interpretation was. In short, the study
confirmed what the model would predict: since agencies can get by without
issuing guidance documents, they are quite likely to substitute less costly
alternatives for more costly ones. Confronted by high marginal costs of
producing guidance, agencies turned to flouting the law, finding cheaper ways to
furnish guidance, or providing no guidance at all.
III
CONCLUSION
Thus I return to the problem of regulatory cost. Broad and vague
delegations of rulemaking power to agencies are an inevitable part of modern
political life. Agencies should implement these mandates at minimal regulatory
cost and as quickly as possible by adopting rules that are substantively accurate,
achieve legislative goals at the least cost to regulatees, and are well publicized
and strongly enforced. Increases in regulatory cost and in the intensity of judicial
review have a powerful negative effect on the rulemaking function and the
production of rules. Thus, we should be extremely cautious about increasing the
costs of rulemaking.
My message is a familiar one: the best is the enemy of the good. More
procedures-for such salutary purposes as enhancing legislative oversight-can
and will produce quite negative impacts on the regulatory process. Pressed to
the limits, the McNollgast hypothesis may lead its true believers to be indifferent
to the problem of regulatory costs. That would be most unfortunate. The short
title of this symposium is "Regulating Regulation." Sometimes "deregulating"
regulation may be in the interests of all who want regulation to work.
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